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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources in the Arctic 
From Cooperation to Confrontation in an Era of 
Geopolitical and Economic Turbulence? 
The northern polar region has been an area of low 
tension since the end of the Cold War. During the past 
two years, geopolitical rivalries have begun to trans-
form cooperative relationships into more confronta-
tional ones. This has an impact on the oil and natural 
gas industry’s development. The Western sanctions on 
Arctic offshore oil development from 2014 in reaction 
to military destabilisation in eastern Ukraine are the 
most visible sign of a rift between Russia and the West. 
If the spirit of cooperation is lost in the energy field, 
political relations will further erode. 
Since 2007/2008 approaches to the Arctic have been 
subjected to change: In 2008, the United States Geo-
logical Survey (USGS) published a very promising fore-
cast for Arctic hydrocarbon resources, according to 
which 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil, a 
third of its undiscovered natural gas and a fifth of its 
undiscovered natural gas liquids may be found in 
the Arctic. Almost three-quarters of these estimated 
resources are located offshore on the five Arctic states’ 
continental shelves. In the aftermath of the survey, 
the Arctic gained a lot of attention, and a new surge 
in oil and gas exploration activities has taken place 
there. A first observation to be emphasised is that the 
run for Arctic hydrocarbons has not contributed to 
geopolitical rivalries as expected, but rather resulted 
in economic and political cooperation to ensure a 
stable environment. This is a precondition for Arctic 
projects because they have very long lead-times. 
The Arctic was part of the endeavour to tap into 
“non-conventional” energy resources driven by then 
high energy prices and high demand prospects in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Since the oil price slump in mid-
2014 and relatively low price levels since then, com-
panies have partly lost their immediate interest in 
hydrocarbon development in the Arctic. This is true 
for oil, but even more true for natural gas, for which 
transport infrastructure is an indispensable requisite, 
significantly adding to the costs. There are increasing-
ly divergent economic calculations, risk assessments 
and energy strategies between the five Arctic coastal 
states: The interest in Arctic hydrocarbons is steady 
from the Russian side and its state-dominated com-
panies, whereas the United States and Canada have 
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6 
move or shied away from this area, including their 
corporate sectors. Denmark (through Greenland) has 
not been a major player in hydrocarbon development. 
For Norway, natural gas exploration in the Barents Sea 
is crucial to maintain current levels of production in 
the future. Oil and gas companies have to adapt to 
new circumstances. As our analysis of the past proves, 
the oil price level and price volatility are major inter-
vening factors, bringing into question the economic 
viability of huge long-term investment projects in 
the Arctic during the downward swing of fossil fuel 
markets. Cyclical markets are nothing new, but there 
are structural changes being driven by nonconven-
tional oil and gas supply (“shale” revolution) and 
shifting trade dynamics. Moreover, high levels of un-
certainty about future demand prospects and about 
structural shifts in the energy mix (away from hydro-
carbons) add to a complicated market situation. 
There is also the danger of falling back to old times: 
During the East-West conflict, the Arctic was a highly 
strategic and militarised region. The mode of silent 
cooperation that has prevailed since the end of the 
Cold War is at risk. Arctic governance has developed 
and helped to settle questions concerning borderlines 
and continental shelves in the past two decades. The 
common sense applied back then to jointly develop 
the abundant resources paved the road for that. This 
was complemented by Arctic environmental govern-
ance. 
We come to the conclusion that a “loss of a cooper-
ative spirit” can be observed, further reinforced by the 
sanctions against the offshore Arctic oil development 
of the Russians. They are hitting Russian national 
interests in a sensitive area, even though they are tar-
geting future oil and natural gas production. The levels 
of instability regarding both economic and political 
issues in the polar region are increasing and have 
mutually reinforcing effects on international politics. 
The dynamics challenge stable and predictable rela-
tions. Visible and stepped-up military activities will no 
longer be balanced, which might result in a “security 
dilemma”. Russia has had the strongest interests in 
stable relations in the past as a precondition for its 
“Arctic oil and gas rush”. This logic and momentum 
are vanishing. Obviously, broader economic issues 
complicate the picture. The national interests of the 
five Arctic coastal states are directed towards develop-
ment of the polar region, and sovereignty issues are 
attached to the coastal waters and exclusive economic 
zones. Traffic is increasing there, as ice-free passages 
have raised the strategic interests of other non-Arctic – 
especially Asian – countries. 
If the spirit of dialogue and cooperation in eco-
nomic and technological areas is fading, negative con-
sequences become more likely, not only for security 
matters but also for environmental ones. Modern West-
ern technologies are being replaced by Asian technol-
ogies, which might present a higher risk to the fragile 
environment. Cooperation to preserve the global com-
mons is less likely in such an environment. A common 
vision for a sustainable Arctic – even though it is high-
ly desirable not only for ecological but also economic 
reasons – is increasingly moving out of reach. Since 
2007, ecological and climate concerns have been 
raised with the reports of the United Nations Inter-
national Panel on Climate Change. Climate change 
is a particularly sensitive topic, with the melting ice-
bergs and polar bears being the major symbols for 
global warming, thus raising public awareness. From 
the perspective of a “carbon emission budget” of a 
world that aims at limiting global warming to two 
degrees Centigrade compared to pre-industrial levels, 
Arctic oil is “unburnable carbon”. The paradox and 
dilemma stem from the circularity that only because 
of retreating ice – itself a consequence of global 
warming driven by fossil fuel consumption – do the 
Arctic hydrocarbon resources become more accessible. 
But if climate change is taken more and more serious-
ly, and if the bottom-up processes agreed upon at 
the COP 21 with the Paris Agreement in 2015 prove 
to become more efficient in the future, the risk of 
stranded assets is particularly high in the Arctic. 
Through the lens of climate mitigation, natural gas 
is a slightly different story, as it can serve as a bridge 
to decarbonisation. 
From a German and European Union (EU) perspec-
tive, the current situation can have far-reaching future 
implications because two of their major energy sup-
pliers, Norway and Russia, have their resource bases 
far north. Potential long-lead effects of the sanctions – 
coinciding with low oil and gas prices – can seriously 
harm (or even kill off long-term development projects 
in the Arctic. This context has to be taken into account 
when discussing supply security in the EU. There are 
good reasons to explore ways towards German/EU-
Norwegian-Russian trilateral cooperation, especially 
for natural gas and infrastructure projects. 
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Through the Prism of Today’s World: 
Arctic Offshore Hydrocarbons 
 
Changing International Dynamics in the Arctic 
and Offshore Hydrocarbon Development 
This research paper aims to analyse the state of Arctic 
offshore hydrocarbon development according to its 
many facets, because the past illustrates that driving/ 
intervening factors have been changing over time.1 
Arctic offshore hydrocarbon activities have to be 
analysed through the prism of economic, geopolitical 
and ecological issues. The oil price slump has had a 
major effect on hydrocarbon projects in the Arctic. 
On top of the shifts in energy economics come rising 
geopolitical tensions globally, which are spilling over 
into the Arctic. In 2014, Russia’s offshore Arctic oil 
development was put under sanctions by the West as 
a response to ongoing hybrid warfare in Ukraine. Our 
hypothesis is that the vector of cooperation is actually 
losing vigour overall. The Ukraine crisis has changed 
the mode of international cooperation twofold: First, 
Russia’s offshore Arctic oil exploration is sanctioned; 
second, the relationship between the West and Russia, 
as the main Arctic stakeholder, has deteriorated and 
many political dialogues are on hold. This presents 
a rupture with the cooperative pattern that has pre-
vailed in the far north since the end of the Cold War. 
There is a potential for destabilisation and an increas-
ing “security dilemma”2 in the Arctic region, which 
can rebound. Turning away from cooperation in the 
Arctic hydrocarbon sector can have sensitive spillover 
effects on energy security, foreign policy and on the 
environment. 
At first glance, the Arctic hydrocarbon conundrum 
is composed of (geo)political, economic, climate and 
environmental cross-cutting issues as well as push and 
pull factors. Assessing the role of the Arctic for current 
and future energy markets provides a very ambiguous 
picture. The driving and limiting factors of Arctic 
hydrocarbon development have been changing over 
 
1  The authors would like to kindly thank Stefan Steinicke, 
Tobias Etzold and another anonymous reviewer for their 
valuable and useful comments on the research paper. Grate-
ful thanks go to Benjamin Gaiser for revising the text. 
2  Tobias Etzold and Stefan Steinicke, Regional Security and 
Cooperation in the Arctic and Baltic Region. Destabilization Follows 
Ukraine Crisis, SWP Comments 44/2015 (Berlin: SWP, 2015), 3. 
time. The extremely promising resources appraisal 
forecasts – such as the USGS Circum-Arctic Resource 
Appraisal of 2008, when oil prices were at their highest 
– resulted in huge interest and increasing levels of 
Arctic oil and gas exploration activities offshore. Arc-
tic hydrocarbon abundance has become an object of 
scrutiny from both governments and business fol-
lowing the rise in the global need for new sources of 
oil and the diversification of natural gas supplies since 
then. Yet, rapidly changing energy markets, shifting 
trade flows to the Asian region and volatile energy 
prices have added to uncertainties and the emergence 
of new risks. 
Today the region is in transition,3 and its geography 
is changing, relating the issues at stake literally to geo-
politics and -economics. The issues stretch from coastal 
lines that are changing due to melting polar caps and 
rising sea levels, the control of exclusive economic 
zones,4 and the definition of continental shelves to the 
issue of free, innocent maritime passages. Shipping 
routes are developing and trade is increasing. Free sea 
lanes are often referred to as part of the global com-
mons, which are in contrast to sensitive sovereignty 
issues of coastal states that aim to protect their terri-
torial seas. Diverse geopolitical and economic interests 
as well as regulatory approaches are (mis)matching in 
the Arctic, creating ambiguous outcomes for the over-
all international environment. 
The Arctic is a distant region but it is also becoming 
part of a globalised world. Its interconnectivity is his-
torically, geographically and economically determined 
and is growing. There is a high level of interconnec-
tivity among the Arctic countries and with non-Arctic 
countries. Apart from strong social and economic 
connections in the near-border areas (Norway-Sweden, 
Sweden-Finland, Finland-Russia, Norway-Russia, United 
States-Canada and others), there is cross-border 
cooperation in a variety of activities concerning the 
 
3  Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize 
Opportunities (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt, November 2013), 1. 
4  An exclusive economic zone is a sea zone prescribed by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over which 
a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use 
of marine resources, including energy production from water 
and wind. 
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transport sector, raw materials, fishing, etc. With in-
creasing trade and shipping activity, the coast guard 
and military presence is being stepped up or consid-
ered by the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark 
(through Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United 
States). Even though the Arctic region is distant from 
the main international playgrounds, non-Arctic states 
such as China and Germany that have observer status in 
the major international governance institution, the 
Arctic Council, contribute to the globalisation of 
the Arctic region. Trans-regional Arctic issues, such as 
maritime transport routes, are equally important to 
Arctic states and non-Arctic states. In particular, China 
views the Northern Sea Route – and in particular the 
north-east passage – as part of its maritime Silkroad 
Initiative.5 Industrial activity opens possibilities and 
creates opportunities for cooperation and managing 
interdependence for mutual benefits. 
With regard to offshore hydrocarbon developments 
in the Arctic, four dimensions are important. First, 
Arctic offshore hydrocarbon development is a chal-
lenging endeavour technologically, environmentally 
and economically. Second, energy and mineral resource 
prospects contribute to the Arctic’s economic globali-
sation, as they increase industrial activities in explo-
ration, development, production and infrastructure 
construction as well as transport activities. They deter-
mine economic development of the coastal areas. Third, 
unlocking these hydrocarbons is a highly strategic 
issue for some parties from national and socio-economic 
– but also from regional and international – points of 
view. Last but not least, climate change and the fragile 
ecological environment provide a major reference 
point for policies and non-governmental activities. 
As emphasised above, Arctic offshore hydrocarbon 
development demands more rather than less inter-
national cooperation to provide long-term stability, 
reduce costs, hedge risks and define what the Paris 
Agreement on Climate of 2015 will mean for Arctic 
hydrocarbons and consumption patterns. Climate 
change is a major intervening factor. The Arctic is 
prospectively rich in hydrocarbon resources but eco-
logically very fragile. Melting icebergs and endangered 
polar bears – as the major symbols for global warming 
– make hydrocarbon development a sensitive societal 
and political issue beyond mere consideration of 
 
5  Marc Lateigne, One of the Three Roads: The Role of the Northern 
Sea Route in Evolving Sino-Russian Strategic Relations, NUPI-Policy 
Brief 2/2015 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, 2015). 
energy economics. Through the lens of decarbonisa-
tion, Arctic offshore oil is “unburnable carbon”.6 
Arctic natural gas, however, might serve as a bridge 
into a more sustainable future. At the same time, 
natural gas resources generate less interest from 
the companies than does oil. The priorities of – and 
visions for – resource development vs. conservation 
differ widely across the globe. 
What Is the Arctic? 
The Arctic is in an area north from the Arctic Circle 
(66°32’N), which is the southern boundary of the mid-
night sun. Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, 
Russia and the United States are the five Arctic states 
(Figure 1). Three other Arctic states have no Arctic 
Ocean outlets (Finland, Iceland and Sweden). However, 
this simple definition is not universally applicable. 
Arctic borders may vary depending on governance, 
average temperatures, vegetation, permafrost, eco-
logical characteristics, etc. 
With respect to hydrocarbons, a wide range of 
classifications of Arctic oil and gas activities exists, 
implying the broad variability of geographical and 
physical parameters: deposits located offshore, on-
shore or partly onshore and located in northern or 
Arctic seas, seasonal ice-covered seas or ice-free water. 
Companies operate in the remote, hard-to-access 
locations and in harsh weather conditions.7 Techno-
logical parameters also vary according to: the type of 
installations for resources exploration and exploita-
tion, ice-resistance characteristics and the necessity 
of ice-breaker maintenance, etc. The most advanced 
technological approach implies subsea, automated, 
remote-controlled and unmanned drilling and pro- 
 
6  See: Christophe McGlade and Paul Ekins, “The Geograph-
ical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused when Limiting Global 
Warming to 2°C”, Nature 517 (2015): 187–99 (187). 
7  Arctic weather conditions are defined as extreme cold 
(more than –40°C), severe storms, underwater and sub-water 
constructions icing, frequent and long-lasting fogs, perma-
frost, shallow sea water areas, strong sea currents, gusty winds 
(up to 36 m/sec), severe ice conditions, sea-bottom plowing, 
darkness and considerable sea level changes (up to 5 m). 
Sourced from: National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea 
Ice News & Analysis, http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/ (accessed 
25 May 2014); Bellona, Report Offshore Oil and Gas Development 
in Northwest Russia: Consequences and Implications, 2007, http:// 
bellona.org/news/uncategorized/2007-11-offshore-oil-and-gas-
development-in-northwest-russia-consequences-and-
implications (accessed June 2014). 
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Figure 1 
Arctic region within the Arctic Circle, adapted by the authors 
 
duction units8 (an example from the industry is the 
Snøhvit gas condensate field in Norway9). Some of 
the oil and natural gas fields in the Arctic are located 
partly offshore and developed both from onshore and 
offshore facilities. Most discovered reservoirs can be 
developed with existing, known and tested technol-
ogies and are located in shallow water.10 In addition, 
energy companies give their own definitions of their 
Arctic projects and of the Arctic itself. For example, 
Statoil defines three Arctic areas: the workable or 
“commercial” Arctic (the Norwegian Barents Sea and 
Canadian East Coast), the “stretch” and the extreme.11 
 
8  Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Chairman of Russian Government, 
“Zagljanem v bezdnu” [Look into Abyss], Rossijskaja Gazeta 
(Russian Newspaper), 14 March 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/ 
03/14/rogozin.html (accessed March 2014). 
9  Statoil, Snøhvit, publication from 12 January 2015, http:// 
www.statoil.com/en/ouroperations/explorationprod/ncs/ 
snoehvit/pages/default.aspx (accessed December 2015). 
10  National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential. Realizing the 
Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources (USA: NPC, 2015). 
11  “Statoil – to Renew Focus on Arctic Exploration”, Reuters, 
5 March 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/video/2014/03/05/statoil-
However, some areas fall out of the Arctic Circle, and 
climate conditions there can be much softer. 
Politically and administratively, the Arctic region 
can be extended up to the 60° parallel and includes 
territorial waters of the United Kingdom and half of 
the territory of Russia. In the case of Arctic offshore 
oil and natural gas resources exploration, the Arctic 
boundary was modified and incorporated to include 
the main Arctic offshore areas: the Barents, Pechora 
and Kara seas, Ob and Taz bays, the Beaufort Sea, 
waters of the Canadian Arctic island archipelagos, 
Prudhoe Bay, the Chukchi Sea and the northern part 
of the Norwegian Sea, as well as Greenland waters 
(Baffin Bay, waters south and east of Greenland, the 
Greenland Sea). Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Nor-
way, Russia and the United States are the five Arctic 
states with Arctic Ocean outlets and Arctic offshore 
areas under their jurisdiction. 
 
to-renew-focus-on-arctic-explora?videoId=287983054 (accessed 
May 2014). 
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Hydrocarbon Developments in the Arctic – 
An Economic Perspective 
 
Assessment of Projects, Locations and 
Lead-times 
The “Arctic bonanza” had its big bang in 2008 because 
of the then published Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal 
on undiscovered oil and natural gas by the USGS.12 
According to the survey, up to 22 per cent of the world’s 
undiscovered oil and natural gas resources may poten-
tially be found in the Arctic, almost 13 per cent of oil 
resources and 30 per cent of natural gas resources.13 
Natural gas is three times more abundant than oil.14 A 
total of 84 per cent of these resources are expected to 
be offshore but located mostly in shallow waters on 
continental shelves of the five Arctic states.15 The Rus-
sian section, and in particular the South Kara Sea, 
is looking most promising: It contains almost 39 per 
cent of the undiscovered gas in the Arctic.16 There are 
nearly 550 oil and natural gas fields in the Arctic 
basins, and approximately 61 large ones, 43 of which 
were found in Russia.17 
Despite the rush in 2008, oil and natural gas explo-
ration activities in the Arctic region have been taking 
place for more than 90 years.18 To date, each of the 
five Arctic coastal states has shown a profound 
interest in Arctic resource management and geopoli-
tics. However, the intensity of oil and natural gas 
 
12  Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil 
and Gas in the Arctic”, Science 324, no. 5931 (2009): 1175–79 
(1178); USGS, Final Report: Oil and Gas Resource Assessment of the 
Russian Arctic, 2008 (Denver, 2015); USGS, Fact Sheet 2008–3049: 
Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and 
Gas North of the Arctic Circle (Vol. 2000), 4. 
13  Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in 
the Arctic” (see note 12): 1178. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Kathrin Keil, “Economic Potential”, in Arctic Security 
Matters, ed. Juha Jokela, EUISS Report No. 24 (Paris: European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, 17 June 2015), 22. 
16  Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in 
the Arctic” (see note 12): 1175. 
17  Phillip Budzik, Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], Office 
of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, Oil and Gas Division, 
2009), 18. 
18  Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Oil 
and Gas (Oslo, 2007), 40. 
resources exploration differs widely among these 
states, even 
Figure 2 
Proven oil and natural gas reserves worldwide and 
Arctic resource potential, million tons of oil equivalent 
(mtoe), compiled by the authors 
*  By the end of 2014; source: “BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2015”, BP, June 2015, http://www.bp.com/ 
statisticalreview (accessed October 2015). 
**  Sum estimates of undiscovered hydrocarbon resources in oil- 
and natural-gas-bearing provinces north of the Arctic Circle by 
2008 (including natural gas liquids); source: USGS, Fact Sheet 
2008–3049: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered 
Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, Vol. 2000 (USA: USGS, 2008), 4. 
though each of these countries has Arctic offshore 
areas. Being extremely technologically demanding 
and risky, offshore activities require huge investments 
from both the corporate and government sides. The 
following analysis is dedicated to showing current oil 
and gas activities in the offshore Arctic areas. 
Table 1 shows average time from discovery to pro-
duction (D-to-P) for offshore oil and natural gas proj-
ects in the Arctic of Canada, Norway, Russia and the 
United States; the two zones with Arctic-like weather 
conditions, Newfoundland and Labrador (Canada); and 
for the Cook Inlet (United States). The average D-to-P 
rates illustrate differences in Arctic offshore resources 
management and interest towards resource explora-
tion among the five Arctic coastal states. 
When interest in exploration began growing in the 
1980s, the United States was at the forefront, during 
which time the average D-to-P rate was only 8.5 years 
(Cook Inlet fields started to produce 11 years after 
their discovery, on average). Most likely, this speedy 
 
0
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development was driven by the two oil crises in the 
1970s and rising oil prices. There was a surge in new 
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Table 1 
Average D-to-P rates in the Arctic by country 
 Canada Canada 
(Newfoundland) 
Norway Russia United 
States 
United States 
(Cook Inlet) 
number of producing fields 0  3  2  2  6  5 
average D-to-P – 17.7 13.5 28.5  8.5 11.4 
number of fields planned to 
be developed* 
0  1  3  7  2  – 
average planned D-to-P –  – 14.3 29.5  37.0  – 
average D-to-P – 22.3 14.0 29.3  15.6  – 
*  Norway: Goliat, Aasta Hansteen, Johan Castberg; United States: Point Thompson, Liberty; Russia: Kharasaveyskoye,  
North-Kamennomysskoye, Kamennomysskoye-Sea, Dolginskoye, Rusanovskoye, Leningradskoye, Kruzenshternskoye;  
Canada (Newfoundland): Hebron. 
 
exploration and development by countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) to reduce their import dependencies 
on the Middle East. 
The next generation of discoveries made in the mid- 
and late 1980s in Russia, Norway and the United States 
appeared to be more time-consuming. By then, how-
ever, oil prices had plummeted. Norway had an aver-
age D-to-P rate of about 14 years, whereas the Russian 
offshore Arctic average was about 30 years (see Table 1). 
This trend has changed only slightly over time. This 
means that actual exploration for Arctic resources is 
far from being intensive, even under the pressure of 
the geopolitical “rush” and the undiscovered resource 
potential. This supports the overall historical trend for 
the non-intensive exploration of Arctic resources. Even 
though technological progress and record-high oil 
prices of the 2000s triggered the trend for Arctic devel-
opment, the on- and offshore share of oil in Arctic 
production has reached 10 per cent of global produc-
tion, and natural gas has reached around 21 per 
cent.19 Since then, most likely, the relative shares have 
declined a bit, given the shale oil and gas revolution 
in the United States. 
As Table 2 (p. 13) shows, there are two producing 
offshore oil and natural gas fields in Norway (Snøhvit 
and Skuld), two in Russia (Prirazlomnoe and Yurkha-
rovskoye), and six in the United States (Northstar, 
Endicott, Pt. McIntyre, Nikaitchuq, Oooguruk and 
Badami) in total. There are no producing fields in the 
Canadian Arctic, but three in the Newfoundland area 
 
19  Solveig Glomsrød and Lars Lindholt, Future Production of 
Petroleum in the Arctic under Alternative Oil Prices, Chapter 5: 
“The Economy of the North” (Norway: SSB, 2008), 69–73. 
(Hibernia, Terra Nova, White Rose). These fields are 
graphically weighted by amount of reserves in Figure 
3 (p. 14). There are also some US projects being con-
ducted in Arctic-like conditions: Cook Inlet (e.g. Granite 
Point, Trading Bay, Middle Ground Shoal, North Cook 
Inlet, Cosmopolitan). 
To summarise, Figure 3 shows “brown” (long-pro-
ducing fields) and “green” or “blue” (recent produc-
tion start of oil or natural gas fields, respectively) 
fields in the offshore Arctic areas. The fields are 
weighted by the amount of reserves (cumulative oil 
and natural gas reserves in mtoe). Two gas fields – 
Yurkharovskoye and Snøhvit – together contribute 
more than two-thirds of overall Arctic offshore produc-
tion. This only comprises around 1 per cent of total 
world oil and natural gas production.20 
The International Energy Agency estimates in its 
World Energy Outlook of 2015 that oil production 
from the Arctic shelf will only play a marginal role 
with 0.2 million barrels a day in output in 2040 (less 
than 1 per cent of global oil consumption at that 
date).21 Even though Arctic oil production is low, 
the undiscovered potential of offshore hydrocarbon 
resources in the Arctic can significantly contribute 
to the total proven reserves worldwide (see Figure 2). 
Thus, national interests are still present in the Arctic. 
 
 
20  Maria Morgunova, Arctic Offshore Hydrocarbon Resource Devel-
opment: Past, Present and Vision of the Future, Universitetsservice 
US-AB, ISBN 978-91-7595-5025 (Sweden: Kungliga Tekniska 
högskolan [KTH], 2015), 123. 
21  International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 
2015 (Paris, 2015), 134. 
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Table 2 
Producing oil and natural gas fields in the Arctic and Newfoundland offshore 
Country, area Field Resource type Recoverable (proven) 
reserves, million tons 
of oil equivalent (mtoe) 
Start of  
production 
Operator 
Canada, New-
foundland 
Hibernia oil 96 1997 ExxonMobil 
Canada, New-
foundland 
Terra Nova oil 55 2002 Petro-Canada 
Canada, New-
foundland 
White Rose oil gas 30 (satellites 
approx. 30) 
2005 HuskyEnergy 
Norway,  
Barents Sea 
Snøhvit gas condensate 194 2007 (satellites 
2014–2015) 
Statoil 
Norway,  
Norwegian Sea 
Skuld oil gas 12 2013 Statoil 
Russia,  
Pechora Sea 
Prirazlomnoe oil 72 2013 Gazprom Neft Shelf 
Russia, Yamal 
(partly offshore) 
Yurkharovskoye gas condensate 424 2003 Novatek 
US, Beaufort Sea Northstar oil 24 2001 BP/Hilcorp* 
US, Beaufort Sea Endicott oil Approx. 65 1986 BP/Hilcorp* 
US, North Slope Pt. McIntyre oil 46 1993 BP Exploration 
(Alaska) 
US, North Slope Nikaitchuq oil 30 2011 Eni 
US, North Slope Oooguruk oil 9.5 2008 Pioneer Natural 
Resources 
US, North Slope 
(partly offshore) 
Badami oil 16.4 1998 BP 
* Hilcorp also acquired 100 per cent of the Northstar and Endicott fields from BP; source: Tim Bradner, “Hilcorp Files Plan for Liberty 
Field Development”, Alaska Journal of Commerce, no. 2 (2015), online July 2015, http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-
Commerce/January-Issue-2-2015/Hilcorp-files-plan-for-Liberty-field-development/ (accessed December 2015). 
 
Arctic “Bonanza” vs. Oil Price Slump – 
The Impact of Market Dynamics 
The Arctic has been part of the envisaged “nonconven-
tional revolution”. The World Energy Outlook in 200822 
paid great attention to nonconventional hydrocarbon 
resources, including Arctic ones. In general, oil and 
natural gas exploration has qualitatively entered a 
new stage since the first decade of the 21st century 
due to technological progress. It has been moving into 
 
22  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008 – Oil and Gas Production Pros-
pects (Paris, 2008). 
new frontiers and new hard-to-reach locations, forcing 
businesses and governments to gather.23 The difference 
between conventional and nonconventional resources 
is mainly based on technology and economics.24 In the 
Arctic, the key issue is the discovery of those Arctic oil 
and gas deposits where exploitation is economically 
 
23  Shell, New Lens Scenarios, A Shift in Perspective for a World in 
Transition (2013), 11, http://www.shell.com/global/future-
energy/scenarios/new-lens-scenarios.html (accessed December 
2015). 
24  David L. Greene, Janet L. Hopson and Jia Li, “Have We Run 
Out of Oil Yet? Oil Peaking Analysis from an Optimist’s Per-
spective”, Energy Policy 34 (March 2006): 515–31 (516). 
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Figure 3 
Comparison of proven recoverable reserves of producing oil and natural gas fields offshore from the Arctic and 
Newfoundland (mtoe), compiled by the authors 
 ‘brown’ or long-producing fields discovered but undeveloped natural gas fields 
 ‘greenfields’, discovered but undeveloped oil fields producing fields in Arctic-like conditions 
 
viable and technologically feasible. Still, offshore hydro-
carbon resources in the Arctic are very speculative. For 
natural gas, the discoveries have to be large enough to 
justify the construction of the necessary export 
infrastructure (pipelines and/or liquefaction plants). 
Energy demand across the world has increased dra-
matically since 2000, with the largest-ever levels of 
growth in energy consumption, in volume terms, oc-
curring between 2002 and 2012.25 Most projections, 
for example by the IEA,26 Shell27 or by Statoil,28 foresee 
 
25  British Petroleum (BP), Energy Outlook 2015, January 2014, 
9, http://www.bp.com/energyoutlook. 
26  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (Paris, 12 November 2013), 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo-2013/. 
27  Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050 (2008), 52, http://www.shell. 
com/global/future-energy/scenarios/2050.html; Shell, New Lens 
a growth in energy demand of up to 41 per cent by 
2035 compared to 2012.29 It is expected that neither 
technology breakthroughs nor price developments or 
market conditions will dramatically change the con-
sumption patterns and will not result in a quick turn-
ing away from global fossil fuel consumption.30 If glo-
 
Scenarios, A Shift in Perspective for a World in Transition, 2013, 
http://www.shell.com/global/future-energy/scenarios/new-lens-
scenarios.html. 
28  Statoil, Energy Perspectives, Long-term Macro and Market Out-
look, June 2013, 44, http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/ 
News/2013/Pages/14Jun_EnergyPerspectives.aspx. 
29  BP, Energy Outlook 2015 (see note 25), 9. 
30  H.-H. Rogner, “An Assessment of World Hydrocarbon 
Resources”, Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 22, 
no. 1 (1997): 217–62. 
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bal demand patterns do not really change fundamen-
tally, fossil fuels will dominate the global energy bal-
ance for the next two decades. 
Economic feasibility of distant or newly explored 
oil and natural gas resources in places other than tra-
ditional oil-producing regions is very dependent on oil 
pricing, due to high exploration costs and technologi-
cal complexity. Since the turn of the century, the oil 
world experienced a steep increase in prices between 
2003 and 2008, an oil price slump during the financial 
and economic crises in 2008/2009, followed by an un-
precedented period of stable high oil prices between 
mid-2009 and mid-2014. In the past decade, the deple-
tion of conventional oil and gas reserves and the on-
going relevance of an oil production plateau (or oil 
peak31) were of great concern. As the new reservoirs 
and nonconventional sources proved to be more ex-
pensive to recover, these new resources have been 
associated with the end of the era of cheap oil32 or 
easy oil (and natural gas to a lesser extent). 
In 2008, before the economic crises unfolded and 
at the beginning of the “Arctic rush”, the cost of Arctic 
oil resources was estimated to range between US$40 
and $100 per barrel, depending on transport costs and 
other overheads, whereas the oil price was around 
US$80–$90.33 Arctic offshore oil and gas is expected 
to require an even higher price. The expectations for 
Arctic offshore oil production were very modest – less 
than 200,000 barrels per day (10 mtoe per year) by 
2035.34 Actual production volumes are higher but are 
expected to increase only a little till 2040.35 During 
the period of very stable and high oil prices between 
2009 and June 2014, a number of companies turned 
their attention to the Arctic: Shell in the Chukchi and 
Beaufort seas, Russian majors Rosneft and Gazprom in 
 
31  Ian Chapman, “The End of Peak Oil? Why This Topic Is 
Still Relevant Despite Recent Denials”, Energy Policy 64 (2014): 
93–101. 
32  Robert L. Hirsch, “The Inevitable Peaking of World Oil 
Production”, The Atlantic Council of the United States Bulletin 16, 
no. 3 (2005): 1–10; Nick A. Owen, Oliver R. Inderwildi and 
David A. King, “The Status of Conventional World Oil Re-
serves – Hype or Cause for Concern?”, Energy Policy 38, no. 8 
(2010): 4743–49; Fredrik Robelius, Giant Oil Fields – the Highway 
to Oil (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2007). 
33  BP, “Energy Charting Tool”, 2015, http://www.bp.com/en/ 
global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-
review-of-world-energy/energy-charting-tool.html (accessed 
20 February 2015). 
34  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008 – Oil and Gas Production (see 
note 22). 
35  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2015 (see note 21), 134. 
the Barents and Kara seas, Cairn to offshore Green-
land, ExxonMobil to the offshore Russian Arctic and 
Alaska, and Eni to offshore Norway. In the last 15 
years, a number of international joint ventures have 
been created36 to commonly explore and develop the 
oil and gas reservoirs in this highly challenging en-
vironment. The most prominent examples are: Shtok-
man Development AG 2008 by Gazprom, Total and 
Statoil; Rosneft and ExxonMobil in Kara Sea in 2011; 
Rosneft and Eni in Barents as well as Rosneft and Stat-
oil in the Barents and Okhotsk seas in 2012; Gazprom 
and Shell in 2013; Novatek, Total and CNPC to con-
struct the Yamal liquefied natural gas plant in 2014; 
BP, ExxonMobil and Imperial Oil in the Beaufort Sea 
in 2010. An industry project of 33 oil and gas compa-
nies has also acquired seismic data in the Barents Sea.37 
In general, huge investments were made across the 
globe in new oil and gas projects. The major outcome 
was the technological breakthrough of combining 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, resulting 
in the “shale revolution” in the United States. These 
new types of nonconventional energy resources, and 
so-called new frontiers, have successively changed the 
world energy balance away from tight markets to an 
oversupply since the second half of 2014. The oil price 
slump, which saw new recent lows in price on 20 
January 2016 (Brent, US$27.6 per barrel), seriously hit 
many high-cost exploration and development plans. 
The Shtokman Field in the Barents Sea was the first 
victim of the “shale revolution”. The promising joint 
venture of Gazprom, Statoil and Total collapsed in 2012. 
After Statoil’s withdrawal, Total followed in June 
2015, passing over its 25 per cent share to Gazprom.38 
 
36  Examples: Shtokman Development AG 2008 by Gazprom, 
Total and Statoil; Rosneft and ExxonMobil in Kara Sea in 
2011; Rosneft and Eni in Barents and Rosneft and Statoil 
in Barents and Okhotsk seas in 2012; Gazprom and Shell in 
2013; Novatek, Total and CNPC to construct Yamal liquefied 
natural gas plant in 2014; BP, ExxonMobil and Imperial Oil 
in the Beaufort Sea in 2010; joint industry project of 33 oil 
and gas companies to acquire seismic data in the Barents Sea 
in 2013–2014, and others. 
37  “Barents Seismic Program Adds New Participants”, Off-
shore-Mag, 25 February 2014, http://www.offshore-mag.com/ 
articles/2014/02/barents-seismic-program-adds-new-participants. 
html. Seismic cooperation gave first results in October 2014. 
For more information: “Seismic Cooperation in the Barents 
Sea Gives New Perspectives”, Statoil, 2 October 2014, http:// 
www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2014/Pages/02Oct_ 
Barents_seismic.aspx. 
38  “Total Withdraw from Shtokman Development AG Share-
holders Board”, Stokman, 5 August 2015, http://www.shtokman. 
ru/en/press/news/2015/274/ (accessed 21 September 2015). 
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At the time of writing at the beginning of 2016, 
there was still an oil oversupply of approximately 1.5 
million barrel per day to up to 2 million barrel per day 
on world markets. Moreover, after the nuclear deal 
with Iran, a major oil and gas producer is coming back 
to world markets, and thus competition over oil mar-
ket shares is expected to increase. Furthermore, the 
United States has lifted its crude oil export ban. Con-
ventional low-cost producers such as Saudi Arabia are 
aiming at pushing competitors out of the market. Last 
but not least, the Chinese economy is displaying more 
and more signs of flattening growth. Thus, oil prices 
most likely will remain at a relatively low level for 
the coming months. The now prevailing perception is 
“low for long” prices. The demand-supply balance of 
oil and gas markets typically displays cyclical swings.39 
The stable and high price period between 2010 and 
2014 is more an exception to the rule. Thus, we are 
observing a “new normal” with the relatively low price 
level but with high short-term volatility. 
A question is whether, and to what extent, smaller-
scale shale and tight oil and gas projects (compared to 
conventional fields) may have a cushioning effect on 
the cyclical amplitudes. Thus, it has to be highlighted 
that energy markets are still characterised by “un-
precedented uncertainty”,40 and the rapidly changing 
energy markets are resulting in an “energy world 
under stress”.41 
Arctic offshore resource development is the “first 
victim” of the downward swing in the oil (and natural 
gas) market. Oil prices do have a robust, long-term 
influence on exploration activities on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf.42 There is clear evidence that the 
volatility of oil prices and the USD/NOK exchange rate 
constitute the highest risks for the Norwegian petro-
leum industry.43 The same is valid for other Arctic 
offshore areas. Supposedly, priority high-cost projects 
such as offshore deepwater and Arctic projects are 
under revision now due to changing risks and profit-
ability assessments. Investments in large complex 
 
39  These issues have been highlighted by several speakers 
during the SWP-Weltenergierat Expert Talks on September 2 
and 3, 2015 taking place under Chatham House rule. 
40  IEA, World Economic Outlook 2010 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010). 
41  IEA, World Economic Outlook 2014 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2014). 
42  Klaus Mohn and Petter Osmundsen, “Exploration Eco-
nomics in a Regulated Petroleum Province: The Case of the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf”, Energy Economics 30 (2008): 
303–20. 
43  Øyvind Bøhren and Steinar Ekern, Usikkerhet I oljeprosjekter. 
Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn [Uncertainty in Oil Projects. 
Relevant and Irrelevant Risk], Beta 1 (1987): 23–30. 
fields are increasingly being revised. Some institutions 
have refused to finance Arctic operations for quite a 
while due to extreme risks, high costs and unpredict-
ability, as with German bank “West LB”.44 The same 
conclusions about uncontrolled and hard-to-manage 
risks were made by Lloyds45 and some Asian investors, 
specifically the Japanese. 
The viability of Arctic on- and offshore oil in com-
petition with other resources is displayed in Figure 4 
(p. 17). 
Today, Western companies mostly keep silent or 
show restrained, pragmatic interest. There are some 
drivers that helped to maintain Arctic offshore activ-
ities (until recently). First is the fact that the reserve 
base for international oil and gas companies is essen-
tial for shareholder value. The pressure on the big 
multinational oil and gas companies to maintain a 
significant reserve base is high. Shell’s activities in 
Alaska in 2015 were a case in point. Shell also made 
this step on the assumption that it could cut costs, 
even though economic and environmental risks were 
substantial.46 The fear of an oil spill and reputational 
losses forced Shell shareholders to “support a resolu-
tion for the company to henceforth report on the cli-
mate risks of its business”.47 Investment funds are in-
creasingly critical of climate and ecologically damag-
ing activities, such as the Dutch Pension fund that 
has asked Shell to halt its activities in the Arctic.48 The 
positive dynamics on stocks of having Arctic hydro-
carbon resources on balance can easily be negated by 
an oil spill. The business faces high risks plus regu-
latory and political uncertainty. Shell abandoned its 
Arctic activities when the Burger J exploration well 
brought disappointing results in autumn 2015. As 
Shell has been a frontrunner of Arctic projects, its 
withdrawal might prevent other companies from 
starting new Arctic activities soon. 
 
44  Mathew Carr, “WestLB, Oil Platform Lender, Won’t Do 
Arctic, Antarctic Business”, Bloomberg Business, 27 April 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-27/westlb-
oil-platform-lender-won-t-do-arctic-antarctic-business (accesses 
December 2015). 
45  Lloyds, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, 
Report (2012), 60. 
46  “Shell Resumes Arctic Drilling but Cuts $15bn from 
Global Investment”, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 29 
January 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31034870 
(accessed December 2015). 
47  Karel Beckman, “Why Shell Can’t Quit the Arctic”, 
Energypost.eu, 22 May 2015, http://www.energypost.eu/shell-
wants-go-arctic/ (accessed September 2015). 
48  Ibid. 
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Figure 4 
Oil production costs for various categories and real imported crude oil price,  
2013 USD per barrel (bl), compiled by authors 
Sources: Dider Houssin, “Resources to Reserves 2013”, Launch Presentation, International Energy Agency, 
http://www.iea.org/etp/resourcestoreserves/ (accessed February 2015); EIA, Short-term Energy Outlook, 10 February  
2015, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/realprices/ (accessed 23 February 2015). 
 
In view of “unprecedented uncertainty” in energy 
markets, a wait-and-see attitude can be observed for 
many big, risky projects. Compared to other countries, 
Arctic offshore exploration in Norway is going ahead. 
However, changes are occurring there: Operators have 
renewed focus and have become more selective about 
the projects to develop because of increasing operat-
ing costs and projected crude oil price stagnation.49 
Rising upstream costs (70 per cent of costs increased in 
the period 2000–200750) and falling drilling productiv-
ity51 have prompted companies to cut their costs, 
 
49  Mikael Holter, “Norway Oil, Gas Producers Maintain 
Record 2014 Spending Forecast”, Bloomberg Business Week, 6 
March 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-03-
06/norway-oil-gas-producers-maintain-record-2014-spending-
forecast. 
50  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008 – Oil and Gas Production 
(see note 22). 
51  Petter Osmundsen, Kristin Helen Roll and Ragnar Tve-
terås, “Exploration Drilling Productivity at the Norwegian 
Shelf”, Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering 73 (2010): 
122–28. 
increase efficiency and/or postpone Arctic offshore 
projects (e.g. Statoil). Recent job cuts all over the 
petroleum and services sectors with no geographical 
borders are the result of both oil price volatility and 
geopolitical destabilisation.52 
 
52  Starting from 2014, Shell has announced numerous jobs 
cuts (250 in Aberdeen alone; sourced from: “Shell Resumes 
Arctic Drilling but Cuts $15bn from Global Investment”, BBC, 
29 January 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31034870). 
Norwegian companies of different scale cut their expenses on 
workforce, which in 2014 has affected 7,000 and could affect 
as many as 40,000 jobs nationwide (sourced from: “Oil Sector 
Cuts 7,000 Jobs – and More to Go”, The Local, 6 November 2014, 
http://www.thelocal.no/jobs/article/oil-sector-cuts-7000-jobs-
and-more-to-go; Mikael Holter, “Norway Oil Sector Braces for 
40,000 Job Cuts amid Downturn”, Financial Post, 10 February 
2015, http://business.financialpost.com/news/norway-oil-
sector-braces-for-40000-job-cuts-amid-downturn). Statoil is 
going to fire 7 per cent of its workforce and a third of its con-
sultants by the end of 2016 (sourced from: “Norway’s Statoil 
to Cut up to 1,500 Jobs by End of 2016”, Reuters Business News, 
16 June 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/16/uk-
statoil-employment-idUKKBN0OW0G020150616). The US 
economy lost more than 9,300 jobs by February 2015 (Jen-
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Since the slump in oil prices, companies have put 
projects on hold in Arctic seas. This is the case with 
almost every oil and gas company that has operated 
there: Eni, Royal Dutch Shell, ConocoPhillips, Exxon 
Mobil, Cairn Energy and BP. The last ones to postpone 
Arctic development were Statoil and Gazprom. Risk 
aversion is noticeable among the big multinational 
oil corporations, which have shied away from major 
investments in big fields, even in recent years. Here, 
the investment cycles are long, and significant capi-
tal is required. Such equivocation also favours the 
“smaller” shale gas and tight oil projects (close to 
existing markets and infrastructure), which have 
shorter investment cycles and are often more quickly 
realised, cheaper and less complex. 
Arctic natural gas is a slightly different story, as 
there are just a few projects (Snøhvit, Yamal LNG, 
Yamal mega project and some others). Gas prices have 
also seen a downward turn because of increasing sup-
plies, more gas-to-gas competition and indirect effects 
for oil-linked prices. What adds to the complex picture 
for natural gas exploration and exploitation is the fact 
that natural gas faces competition from other fuels in 
nearly all of its applications (power and heat genera-
tion, industry and transport). Thus, EU climate and 
energy policies for 2020 and 2030 as well as Germa-
ny’s Energiewende are of decisive importance for gas 
projects in the Arctic. In the case of (much) higher 
carbon dioxide prices or greenhouse gas emission-
reduction targets, coal would lose out to natural gas; 
yet, energy-efficiency measures and the expansion 
of renewable energies would reduce natural gas con-
sumption. Natural gas is a relatively clean fossil fuel. 
Russian Arctic natural gas projects have not been 
subjected to EU sanctions (which are discussed in the 
chapter “The Impact of the Crisis over Ukraine and 
Sanctions on Russia”). 
Arctic gas can by a narrow margin compete on the 
market with American shales (and Arctic onshore Rus-
sian fields with existing infrastructure, where gas is 
delivered to Europe, are the lowest-cost gas source for 
Western European gas markets). 
 
nifer A. Dlouhy, “U.S. Oil-industry Job Losses Continued 
to Grow in February”, Alaska Dispatch News, 6 March 2015, 
http://www.adn.com/article/20150306/us-oil-industry-job-
losses-continued-grow-february). 
Diverging National Interests in Hydrocarbon 
Development in the five Arctic States 
Economic calculations still function as the major ref-
erence point, even more so for private multinational 
oil and gas companies. The abovementioned develop-
ment patterns still provide important path dependen-
cies for potential Arctic hydrocarbon development. 
However, a glance to the past shows that also strategic 
considerations have played a role in Arctic hydro-
carbon development – geopolitical turmoil in major 
regions producing conventional resources, such as the 
oil crises in the Middle East in the 1970s, incentivised 
new exploration activities in other geographic areas to 
have a more diversified energy supply. Simultaneous-
ly, they made the Arctic, which is a distant and hard-
to-explore location, an attractive place for many West-
ern oil and gas majors. In the 2000s one driver push-
ing producers to the Arctic has been the re-nationalisa-
tion of oil and gas reserves in many traditional regions. 
Multinational oil and gas companies have looked for 
access to new, promising reservoirs. Against the back-
drop of more complicated economic (and geopolitical) 
circumstances, national interests have started to in-
creasingly diverge. 
 
Norway. Norway has kept the same pace of relatively 
fast production startup of newly discovered fields (see 
Table 1). Still, most of Norway’s oil and gas is exploited 
outside Arctic waters, but future prospects and recent 
findings indicate that, in the future, the Barents Sea 
has the potential to become a major producing region 
in the Arctic. Norway is considered to be the global 
leader in Arctic exploration and takes second place for 
total offshore oil and natural gas volumes. However, 
the volumes are modest. 
Between 1975 and 2011, Norway had a moratorium 
for Arctic oil exploration and production because of a 
border dispute with the Soviet Union/Russia. In 2010 
the two countries solved the issue and the respective 
treaty was ratified in 2011 by both sides. The part of 
the Norwegian Arctic that holds the most prospect for 
exploration is the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea, 
where the only field developed so far is Snøhvit (pro-
duction started in 2007).53 It has been the most rapidly 
developing Arctic offshore area until now. The first oil 
 
53  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, “Facts 2013”, Chapter 
10: “Fields in Production”, 26 April 2013, http://www.npd.no/ 
en/Publications/Facts/Facts-2013/Chapter-10/ (accessed Novem-
ber 2015). 
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field in the Barents Sea – the Goliat (discovered in 
2009 and developed by ENI and Statoil) is expected to 
begin producing in early 2016.54 The Johan Castberg 
project (Skrugard and Havis twin discoveries of 2011 
and 2012, respectively) are expected to receive an in-
vestment decision by 2017.55 Skuld (Fossekall, 2009; 
Dompap, 2010) in the northern part of the Norwegian 
Sea is one of the fast-track developments launched 
in March 2013.56 The 23rd licensing round started in 
April 2015, during which 11 blocks have been granted 
in the Barents Sea.57 
The Norwegian state energy company Statoil actively 
participates in offshore oil and natural gas projects of 
different scale, also outside the Arctic (more than 130 
projects in the North Sea and 30 elsewhere as of Janu-
ary 201558). However, this has been slowing down due 
to recent cost reductions in Norway (investments in 
the oil and gas sector are predicted to drop by almost 
40 per cent from 2014 to 2017)59 and elsewhere in the 
petroleum industry. 
As Norway’s state budget heavily relies on hydro-
carbon exports, the country can be expected to open 
new frontiers in offshore Arctic areas60 in a more 
stable economic environment. The Barents Sea is of 
strategic importance for the country’s wealth. Given 
the strong resource base in the Barents Sea, an expan-
sion of the export infrastructure is key. As investment 
decisions for development, production and infrastruc-
ture construction depend on commercial decisions of 
companies, the discovery of huge prospective fields as 
well as security (or at least predictability) of demand 
are two necessary preconditions. This, in turn, has im-
 
54  “ENI Delays First Oil from Arctic Goliat Field to Early 
2016”, Rigzone, 22 December 2015, http://www.rigzone.com/ 
news/oil_gas/a/142221/ENI_Delays_First_Oil_from_Arctic_ 
Goliat_Field_to_Early_2016#sthash.VdraIlJJ.dpuf (accessed 
January 2016). 
55  “Johan Castberg”, SubseaIQ, http://www.subseaiq.com/data/ 
Project.aspx?project_id=887 (accessed July 2015). 
56  Statoil, “Skuld Has Started Production”, News, 19 Novem-
ber 2013, http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/ 
2013/Pages/18Mar_Skuld.aspx (accessed December 2015). 
57  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, “Awards in Predefined 
Areas 2015 – Announcement”, http://www.npd.no/en/Topics/ 
Production-licences/Theme-articles/Licensing-rounds/APA-
2015/APA-2015---announcement/ (accessed November 2015). 
58  “Offshore Field Development Projects, Search Conducted: 
Operator ‘Statoil’”, SubseaIQ, 2014, http://www.subseaiq.com/ 
data/default.aspx (accessed 13 January 2015). 
59  “Is Norway’s Oil & Gas Industry Doomed?”, Blouin news, 15 
December 2015, http://blouinnews.com/84758/story/norways-
oil-gas-industry-doomed (accessed January 2015). 
60  Keil, “Economic Potential” (see note 15), 24. 
portant implications for the EU, as Norway is a key 
country for the EU’s efforts to diversify its oil and gas 
supplies. Thus, the energy future of Norway as well 
as the EU is dependent on maintaining stability in the 
Arctic. 
 
Russia. In Russia, there has been almost no accelera-
tion of Arctic hydrocarbon development. Yet, Russia 
has vast resources and ambitious plans to develop 
Arctic offshore fields (seven are queuing). The exploi-
tation of Arctic reserves is a strategic issue for Russia, 
both in terms of modernising its oil and gas industry 
and for replacing the depleting oil fields onshore. 
Most of Russia’s hydrocarbons are located in the north, 
in particular in western Siberia. Most importantly, 
Russia’s major gas producer, Gazprom, faces a surplus 
capacity of natural gas in western Siberia,61 limiting 
its appetite to develop new large deposits. For a few 
other Russian oil and gas companies, such as Novatek, 
the Arctic is of strategic importance to gain the larger 
market share and draw nearer to Rosneft and Gaz-
prom, where the oversized costs are partly account-
able for that market division. 
The Russian model of offshore resource exploration 
relies on a strong governmental component. The devel-
opment of the shelf was defined as strategic, thus the 
offshore licences were reserved by law for Russian 
state (-dominated) companies Rosneft and Gazprom.62 
The main offshore areas are the Barents, Kara, Pechora, 
Laptev, East-Siberian and Chukchi seas. The Russian 
section of the Arctic Sea, and in particular the South 
Kara Sea, is looking to be the most promising by far, 
as it contains almost 39 per cent of undiscovered gas 
in the Arctic.63 In spite of that, the only two producing 
fields currently are Prirazlomnoye (discovered in 1989/ 
in production since 2013) and Yurkharovskoye (1970/ 
2003, partly offshore). The majority of the fields in the 
Russian Arctic were discovered in the 1980s (Yamal 
Peninsula – 1970s), when the average time from dis-
covery to production was around 30 years. The activ-
ities on the Russian Arctic shelf had intensified in 
 
61  See: James Henderson and Tatiana Mitrova, The Political and 
Commercial Dynamics of Russia’s Gas Export Strategy, OIES Paper: 
NG 102 (Oxford: OIES, 2015). 
62  James Henderson, Key Determinants for the Future of Russian 
Oil Production and Exports, OIES WPM 58 (Oxford: OIES, 2015), 5, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/04/WPM-58.pdf (accessed 23 October 2015), 11. 
63  Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in 
the Arctic” (see note 12); Budzik, Arctic Oil and Natural Gas 
Potential (see note 17). 
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2011, when Gazprom and Rosneft started to actively 
involve international partners such as ExxonMobil, 
Eni and Statoil in the exploration process: Rosneft and 
ExxonMobil in the Kara Sea in 2011; Rosneft and Eni 
in the Barents Sea, and Rosneft and Statoil in the 
Barents and Okhotsk seas in 2012; Gazprom and Shell 
in 2013; Novatek, Total and the China National Petro-
leum Corporation (CNPC) are currently constructing 
the Yamal liquefied natural gas plant. These coopera-
tion agreements were highly strategic for Russia. In 
September 2014, the long-awaited discovery of oil at 
the Universitetskaya structure in the Kara Sea was 
made by a consortium of Rosneft and ExxonMobil.64 
However, ExxonMobil completely withdrew from the 
project and the Russian Arctic as a consequence of US 
sanctions imposed the same month. Other exploration 
activities have been put on hold and postponed beyond 
2030,65 due to US and European sanctions against 
Russia on technology-transfer and the financial sector 
as well as due to economic turmoil. Russian compa-
nies relied on financial resources of their Western 
partners to cover exploration costs as well as on West-
ern technologies and services to explore and develop 
offshore fields in the polar region. Thus, most likely, 
the two producing fields on the Russian Arctic shelf, 
Prirazlomnoye and Yurkharovskoye, will be the only 
ones for the near future, if the Yamal mega project 
(partly offshore, where only the onshore reservoirs are 
now being developed) is not taken into account. 
 
United States. In the United States, the Arctic oil and 
gas challenge started onshore with Norman Wells 
(1920/1932), which was the first Arctic onshore field, 
followed by the Cook Inlet (1960s) fields (7 fields: 4 oil, 
3 gas, 16 platforms, 12 active), which lie outside the 
Arctic Circle, and Prudhoe Bay (1968/1977). The main 
production sites are situated in the Alaskan Beaufort 
Sea and North Slope. Some activities took place in the 
Chukchi Sea. The prescriptive US offshore petroleum 
 
64  “Offshore Field Development Projects, Pobeda”, SubseaIQ, 
9 December 2014, http://www.subseaiq.com/data/Project. 
aspx?project_id=2007 (accessed December 2015). 
65  “GazpromNeft Decided to Postpone Dolginskoye Field 
Exploration until 2031”, Arctic Info, 23 November 2015, http:// 
www.arctic-info.ru/FederalMonitoringMedia/23-11-2015/ 
dni-arktiki-v-moskve--gosydarstvennaa-politika-v-arktike-i-
infrastryktyra-sevmorpyti--monitoring-federal_nih-smi--16- 
21-noabra (accessed November 2015). 
governance with precise requirements66 has resulted 
in six currently producing fields in the US Arctic shelf. 
It is unlikely that the results of the past can be re-
peated. Recently, the new licence rounds for 2016 and 
2017 were cancelled.67 The main reasons for that were 
the same – economic and ecological risks, whereby oil 
companies willing to keep the Arctic offshore licences 
under their control until the “better times” now have 
to wrap up. Canadian and US interest in exploring Arc-
tic natural gas is low because of other, basically non-
conventional, sources onshore. In the United States, 
the D-to-P rate has significantly slowed down due to 
some uncompleted construction projects (the Point 
Thomson oil field has been queuing for 51 years). Yet, 
this displays an almost complete lack of interest by 
the United States in developing Arctic offshore oil 
and natural gas resources. Domestic “shale oil and 
gas development” won the race for nonconventional 
hydrocarbon production in North America after the 
fracking revolution took place there. 
This, however, should not divert attention from 
the fact that there are other drivers that might play 
out in the future. On the one hand, the state of Alaska 
is heavily dependent on oil and gas for its economic 
development; on the other hand, the polar nature is 
highly fragile, posing a dilemma to future develop-
ment patterns. Moreover, strategic considerations 
about the future energy position of the United States 
have been raised in the Report of the National Petro-
leum Council on Arctic Potential.68 They emphasise 
the need for Arctic hydrocarbon development if the 
United States is aiming at maintaining its position as 
an energy-self-sufficient country when tight and shale 
oil reservoirs deplete in the 2030s and 2040s. For for-
eign and strategic reasons, representatives of this ap-
proach argue that the development of Arctic offshore 
hydrocarbons should be pursued today, given the long 
lead-times of projects.69 
 
66  Det Norske Veritas, OLF/NOFO – Summary of Differences 
between Offshore Drilling Regulations in Norway and U.S. Gulf of 
Mexico, Rev. 02, 26 August 2010 (Norway: DNV, 2010). 
67  “USA Says Bye to the Arctic Oil” [SShA govorjat “do svi-
danija” arkticheskoj nefti], Eadaily, 26 October 2015, https:// 
eadaily.com/news/2015/10/26/ssha-govoryat-do-svidaniya-
arkticheskoy-nefti (accessed November 2015). 
68  National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential. Realizing the 
Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources, 2015 (USA: NPC, 2015). 
69  Ibid., 1; C. Ebinger, “The U.S. Is More Energy Self-sufficient 
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Canada. The Canadian fields Hibernia (1979/1997), 
Hebron (1981/2017), Terra Nova (1984/2002) and White 
Rose (1988/2005) are situated lower than the Arctic 
Circle. Sometimes these fields are ascribed to the Arc-
tic exploration experience; however, project operators 
place them in the category of Atlantic projects70 with 
harsh environments (not the Arctic environment). Not 
taking into account these Newfoundland and Labra-
dor fields, Canada has no ongoing Arctic offshore proj-
ects. There are currently no operating offshore fields 
in the Arctic, but there is one – Amauligak oil and gas 
field (discovered in 1984) – that is still waiting for an 
investment decision to be made (for almost 30 years).71 
There are also no ongoing drilling operations offshore 
in the Canadian Arctic, and only one single well has 
been drilled during the last 20 years. Canada currently 
has no plans in the Arctic, as it has other, more acces-
sible resources elsewhere (for example, oil sands). 
Under strong pressure from indigenous peoples, and 
after the Deepwater Horizon spill, the National Energy 
Board of Canada is following the strictest ecological 
safety measures offshore, such as their “same season 
relief well policy”.72 It requires two wells to be drilled 
during the same ice-free season, whereby one is an 
exploration well and another a relief well. In the Beau-
fort Sea, which has an entire drilling window of only 
four months, this is almost impossible to achieve.73 
This regulation is creating insuperable economic and 
technological barriers to the development of the off-
shore oil and natural gas industry in the Canadian 
Arctic. There have been no changes in Canada due 
to an absence of any kind of drilling or exploration; 
Canadian tar sands took that spot of nonconventional 
production. In other words, North American Arctic 
 
than-ever-before-and-the-arctic-can-assure-it-stays-that-way/ 
(accessed January 2016). 
70  Husky Energy, “Projects”, http://www.huskyenergy.com/ 
operations/growthpillars/atlantic/projects.asp (accessed 
March 2014). 
71  M. E. Enachescu, P. J. Meehan and G. W. Smee, “Amauligak 
and Beyond: The Quest for a Canadian Beaufort Sea Economic 
Threshold” (Abstract), Bulletin of Canadian Petroleum Geology 39, 
no. 2 (1991): 211. 
72  A relief well is one contingency measure used to respond 
to an out-of-control well. Sourced from: NEB, “What Is the 
National Energy Board’s Policy Regarding Same Season Relief 
Wells?”, December 2011, https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/nrth/ 
rctcffshrdrllngrvw/2011fnlrprt/index-eng.html (accessed 
January 2015). 
73  James Henderson and Julia Loe, The Prospects and Challenges 
for Arctic Oil Development, 2014 (Oxford: The Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies [OIES], 2014), 20. 
offshore oil and gas are relatively uncompetitive 
domestically.74 
 
Denmark (Greenland). Greenland has not discovered 
any offshore oil or gas fields, yet.75 Cairn Energy is the 
biggest offshore licence holder in Greenland. However, 
in total, 14 wells have been drilled offshore from Green-
land (8 by Cairn Energy),76 and no big findings were 
reported.77 Statoil and Dong gave back their licences. 
To summarize, as data shows, the development of 
Arctic offshore resources is obviously ongoing, but 
resource exploration has not drastically intensified. 
The major obstacle is currently the price environment. 
This, however, does not deprive the Arctic of its off-
shore oil and natural gas resources potential. The 
intensity of oil and natural gas resources development 
differs among the five Arctic coastal states – from low 
commercial interest in the west to strategic priority 
in the east.78 National offshore governance systems, 
access to resources and state support according to 
national interests influence the intensity of explora-
tion of Arctic offshore oil and natural gas resources. 
Arctic offshore oil and natural gas activity will be 
dependent on the strategic plans of every country to 
promote or limit Arctic offshore oil and gas resources 
development. External factors such as oil price, under-
regulation and geopolitical tensions are decisive, 
though. Another issue is technological cooperation in 
order to make available best-practices as well as safe 
and efficient technologies, because the Arctic is an 
ecologically sensitive region. With respect to national 
interests, it can be concluded that in the United 
 
74  Keil, “Economic Potential” (see note 15), 22. 
75  According to data from the government of Greenland, 
Cairn Energy (the most active operator offshore in Green-
land), Nunaoil (the national oil company of Greenland), the 
Oil&Gas Journal, the Financial Times and other credible company 
and media sources, there are no discoveries being made on 
offshore Greenland, though there are multiple prospects and 
licence areas being targeted by international oil and gas com-
panies. 
76  Cairn Energy, “Greenland, Activity”, http://www. 
cairnenergy.com/index.asp?pageid=80 (accessed 24 January 
2014). 
77  Andreas Østhagen, “Dimensions of Oil and Gas Develop-
ment in Greenland” (The Arctic Institute, December 2012), 
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States, shale gas has higher priority in terms of 
national security and energy self-sufficiency than any 
other projects, whereas Canada is taking long-term 
decisions on the destiny of the Trans-Alaska oil pipe-
line and whether to open the Arctic Wildlife National 
Refuge for exploration. Other relatively expensive non-
conventionals have higher priority for being explored. 
Greenland is striving for independence and higher rev-
enues. Thus, it unsuccessfully tried to intensify both 
seismic and exploration activities under Danish super-
vision though the company Cairn Energy. Even though 
the main offshore activities in Norway are still concen-
trated south of the Arctic Circle, Barents Sea oil and 
natural gas discoveries can obtain a higher priority 
because Norway needs to maintain its oil and natural 
gas production to sustain its level of exports. Arctic 
offshore oil and natural gas development is of high 
strategic priority for Russia but cannot be handled 
without international cooperation under “sanction” 
conditions. 
 
 
 SWP Berlin 
Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources in the Arctic 
February 2016 
 
 
 
23 
(Geo)Politics in the Arctic – Is International Cooperation on 
Hydrocarbon Development Fading? 
 
Arctic Governance after the 
End of the Cold War 
As described above, interests in Arctic offshore hydro-
carbons are increasingly diverging and asymmetrical 
among the five Arctic coastal states under the new 
market conditions. The growing asymmetry, disinter-
est and disinvestment may result in a loss of stability. 
In the past, economic cooperation in hydrocarbon 
development was supposedly a major driver for the 
common political movement towards stability. Long 
investment cycles demand a stable environment. 
Nowadays, the tensions between Russia and the West 
following the annexation of Crimea and military con-
flict in eastern Ukraine destabilise the achievements 
in regional cooperation in the Arctic and globally. 
A look at Arctic governance displays the coopera-
tive spirit in international relations that has prevailed 
in the far north since the end of the Cold War. With 
respect to hydrocarbon development in the Arctic, the 
issues of delineation of the seabed and the continental 
shelf as well as environmental and technological issues 
are important. The retreating of ice cover and better 
access to sea passages and territories has resulted in 
new ambitions. All circumpolar states are involved in 
territorial disputes. These territorial claims are centred 
on extending the respective exclusive economic zones 
of each country in line with the continental shelf, for 
example with the Lomonosov Ridge (the underwater 
ridge of continental crust in the Arctic Ocean) by Rus-
sia and later by Denmark and Canada. Against the 
background of the 2008 Circum-Arctic Resource Ap-
praisal, a sense of geopolitical instability was created 
as well as a race for resources. Yet, this has not resulted, 
as expected, in geopolitical rivalries but in a striving 
towards cooperation, predictability and stability. 
With the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the Arctic 
states recognised the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a regulation base for 
Arctic governance (except by the United States, which 
has not ratified it, yet) and emphasised their commit-
ment to settle overlapping territorial claims in line 
with the convention.79 The reformation of fundamen-
tal principles of sea governance was made by UNCLOS 
in 1982 and is still helping “individual members of 
the community of nations”80 to secure the share of re-
sources. The Convention defines the extent of coastal 
states’ territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. 
This has implications for ownership of seabed and 
marine resources.81 UNCLOS provides the procedures 
and mechanisms for extending the coastal states’ 
rights to seabed resources that lie outside their exclu-
sive economies zones. Territorial claims are being sub-
mitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Conti-
nental Shelf (CLCS), which makes recommendations 
based on scientific evaluations. Yet, these recommen-
dations are non-binding when claims of different 
states overlap. Thus, the delineation of the continental 
shelves is subject to political settlement.82 
Beyond the UNCLOS regime and the Arctic Council, 
Arctic coastal states have concluded a number of bilat-
eral cooperation agreements. The most important one 
with respect to hydrocarbon development and East-
West cooperation is the treaty between the Kingdom 
of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning 
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents 
Sea and the Arctic Ocean, 2010,83 which ended the 
Norwegian moratorium for Arctic offshore hydro-
carbon exploration (see page 18 above). 
With respect to the still open settlement of bounda-
ries of respective continental shelves, it is important 
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to highlight that most of the significant oil and natu-
ral gas fields are located in the exclusive economic 
zones or national territorial waters and not in over-
lapping areas.84 The delineation and delimitation of 
continental shelves in the Arctic has not been settled 
yet, but it appears that there will not be much of a 
common area (beyond the limits of national juris-
diction) left for the International Seabed Authority. 
This authority organises activities and administers 
commonly used areas.85 
Despite the geostrategic moves, Russia has until 
recently embraced multilateral governance such as 
the Arctic Council and UNCLOS and has submitted 
its territorial claims to the CLCS. Russia revised and 
finally submitted its claim on 3 August 2015 because 
of the Commission’s dissatisfaction with its initial 
submission.86 Thus, up to now, Arctic coastal states 
have lived up to the rule-based procedures. 
Even though UNCLOS regulates offshore activities 
on the international level, the legislation, technical 
standards and overall approaches differ on the national 
levels. This is where the Arctic Council has a role to 
play due to its focus on environment and technology, 
and indeed it has become an agenda-shaping institu-
tion that is aiming at common principles for inter-
national and national legislation in the North Pole 
region. 
In general, the governance patterns reflect the 
issue that the Arctic is a special region that consists 
of remote lands of several northern states87 governed 
from distant political centres. Arctic governance is 
so far organised in an “exclusive club” because of a 
variety of sovereignty issues. Playing a key role is the 
platform of the Arctic Council, established in 199688 – 
 
84  Koivurova, Käpylä and Mikkola, Continental Shelf Claims in 
the Arctic (see note 79), 5. 
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org.jm/authority (accessed 22 December 2015). 
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87  Oran R. Young, “Governing the Arctic: From Cold War 
Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation”, Global Governance 11, no. 1 
(2005): 9–15. 
88  This analysis focusses on the governance mechanisms 
mostly relevant for hydrocarbon development. It is worth 
mentioning that Arctic governance consists of a multi-level 
framework: regional (Arctic Council), sub regional (Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council), inter-governmental (Nordic Council of 
Ministers), communitarian (EU) and bilateral ones. Coopera-
tion functions on governmental, business and indigenous 
levels (the Sami Council, the Russian Association of Northern 
Minorities). The International Maritime Organization, the EU 
and NATO directly or indirectly influence Arctic management. 
an intergovernmental forum of Arctic countries 
(Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden and the United States) and indigenous people. 
The Arctic Council is characterised by advisory instru-
ments and prompting format; however, some decisions 
are followed by binding provisions. The members are 
countries with different priorities and strategies for 
the Arctic. 
Yet, there are also non-Arctic states, mainly from 
Asia, which are actively entering the Arctic geopoliti-
cal and business club: China views northern sea routes 
as parts of its maritime Silk Road. Indian companies 
have significant interest in the joint development of 
oil and natural gas fields in northern and Arctic Rus-
sia. South Korea is ready to create a common business 
model for the Arctic, where its special geographical 
and ecological characteristics are recognised. As one of 
Asia’s financial centres, Singapore has its own interest 
in the Arctic, which is to hedge related business risks. 
The Asian shipping industry is keen to sell more ships 
and platforms to serve northern exploration and 
production. 
There are also remarkable differences between the 
Arctic and non-Arctic states that result from their geo-
graphical positions, jurisdictional status and access to 
the Arctic Ocean. On one hand, some non-Arctic states 
argue for the global character of the Arctic and Arctic 
politics (France, Japan). On the other hand, none of the 
non-Arctic states have acquired rights comparable to 
those of the Arctic countries, which are based on inter-
national laws. Thus, non-Arctic states need provision 
from Arctic states for any kind of activities in the Arc-
tic waters, whether outside or inside the 350-mile zone. 
The cooperation of Non-Arctic states is valuable in 
many aspects for the Arctic region’s development and 
should be included on different levels – these are sea 
and environmental safety, shipping, research, fishing, 
etc. This is a second key to the sustainability of the 
region. The Arctic Council has 12 observers,89 among 
them six EU member states such as Germany, but also 
Japan, South Korea, China, Singapore and India. The 
Arctic Council format of membership and observer 
status helps countries to mitigate and/or eliminate 
conflicts. The EU’s application has not been accepted 
so far. The reasons are manifold. First, the European 
Parliament created some irritation in 2008 when it 
called for an international Arctic Treaty, comparable 
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to the Antarctic Treaty System. The Arctic states entirely 
rejected the proposal. For them it was a threat to their 
sovereignty and to the legal status quo in the region.90 
Second, the EU approved a ban in 2008 on the trade of 
commercial seal products. Last but not least, the activ-
ities raised broader concerns that the international 
community was cutting too far into the sphere of pri-
macy of the five northern polar coastal states in the 
management of Arctic affairs.91 Meanwhile, the Arctic 
Council has brought members and observers to the 
same level of appreciation. For example, observers have 
to recognise the international laws of the sea, sover-
eignty, the rights and jurisdictions of the Arctic states 
in the Arctic, as well as the specifics and culture of the 
region. 
The Arctic Council has its focus on environmental 
issues and technological cooperation, which are highly 
relevant for energy exploration and exploitation. The 
cooperation on these technical and environmental 
issues paved the way for stable cooperation before the 
Ukraine crisis. Two binding agreements have been 
signed and come into force: one on “cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic”, which came into force in January 2013; and 
the second on “Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic”, signed in 
May 2013.92 The latter aims at enhancing and 
speeding up cooperation in oil-spill response. 
It can be summarised that, in general, the Arctic 
Council had a positive influence on Arctic cooperation 
up until the geopolitical tensions between Russia and 
the West due to the Ukraine conflict. The prospects 
concerning Arctic offshore oil and gas exploration 
have moved governance development93 forward be-
cause the projects with long lead-times require a 
stable environment. Delimitation issues, economic 
factors and technological possibilities have motivated 
the international political and business communities 
to jointly elaborate on a governance structure in the 
Arctic region. The analysis shows that it is reasonable 
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statements/agreements (accessed 18 September 2015). 
93  Christoph Humrich, “Fragmented International Govern-
ance of Arctic Offshore Oil: Governance Challenges and Insti-
tutional Improvement”, Global Environmental Politics 13, no. 3 
(2013): 80; Huebert and Yeager, A New Sea (see note 80), 4. 
to balance interests, manage interdependencies 
and promote cooperation. The gaps in governance 
and regulations, such as harmonisation of ecological 
standards, are manageable through combined govern-
ance mechanisms as well as bilateral and regional 
agreements. Arctic research and knowledge-exchange94 
also play an important role in finding the common 
path to regional prosperity and sustainability. Ger-
many and the EU have been aiming at balancing the 
two. The EU Council’s conclusions of 12 May 2014 out-
line that action should put an emphasis on “support-
ing research and channeling knowledge to address 
the challenges of environmental and climate changes 
in the Arctic; acting with responsibility to contribute 
to ensuring economic development […] based on sus-
tainable use of resources and environmental exper-
tise”.95 Germany’s Arctic Policy guidelines96 try squar-
ing the circle of environmental and climate protection 
and economic opportunities by calling for the highest 
environmental standards possible and the use of the 
newest technologies.97 It remains to be seen to what 
extent the deterioration of the relationship between 
Russia and the West will affect that balanced approach 
in the future. 
The Impact of the Crisis over Ukraine and 
Sanctions on Russia 
Since the end of Cold War, the Arctic – despite oppos-
ing national interests – has been characterised as a 
peaceful zone of cooperation with normalised politi-
cal relationships among the Arctic states98 and little 
political tension. Until 2013, countries had only inten-
sified cooperation in a positive way, including armed 
forces cooperation. Energy cooperation expanded in 
many facets, and Russia has had a clear interest in a 
stable business environment in the Arctic in order 
to develop its hydrocarbons. Yet, since 2014, the eco-
nomic situation and the energy price slump have 
 
94  The example is the interdisciplinary research project 
INSROP – the International Northern Sea Route Programme. 
95  Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Devel-
oping a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region, Foreign 
Affairs Council meeting (Brussels: Council of the European 
Union, 2014), Press, 1. 
96  Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines (see note 3). 
97  Stefan Steinicke, Exposè Doktorandenkolloquium, 15 Septem-
ber 2015 (unpublished manuscript). 
98  Charles Emmerson and Glada Lahn, Arctic Opening: Oppor-
tunity and Risk in the High North (London: Chatham House, 2012). 
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coincided with the difficult geopolitical situation, 
creating a very unfavourable environment for inter-
national Arctic relations. The loss of a relatively stable 
Arctic region is tangible and also creating new risks 
for the security of oil and gas supplies in the future. 
The Russian economy is suffering from the oil price 
slump, national currency devaluations and a shortage 
of capital.99 
The imposition of Western sanctions on Russia as a 
response to military destabilisation in Ukraine as well 
as Russian countersanctions contribute to that through 
the overall deterioration of the relationship, but also 
because the common development of future hydro-
carbon projects is being sanctioned. In 2014 two docu-
ments were published on July 31 and September 8 con-
taining restrictive measures against Russia. In Decem-
ber 2015, these sanctions were prolonged till 31 July 
2016. The EU has limited the access of the Russian 
state and national oil and gas companies to European 
long-term financing, and the entire Russian oil indus-
try (not natural gas production) to European technol-
ogies and equipment (drilling, well testing and log-
ging services). The duration of credit was cut to 30 
days for Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft. Nearly 
the same actions were taken by the United States, 
which listed Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Rosneft, LUKoil 
and Surgutneftegaz. The EU specified their sanctions 
against Russia in the beginning of December 2014, 
in particular what is meant by “Arctic” projects. The 
sanctioned Arctic oil activities were defined as “oil 
exploration and production in the offshore area north 
of the Arctic Circle”.100 The same definition was given 
by the United States a month earlier. Before specifica-
tions, sanctions could also target onshore oil projects. 
Moreover, according to the December 2014 docu-
ments, restrictions target not only Russian territory 
but also its exclusive economic zone and sea shelf. 
The only equipment that is allowed to be supplied 
for the Russian oil industry is that which prevents or 
mitigates oil spills or other accidents that may have 
significant impact on human health and safety or the 
environment. Importantly, the sanctions do not apply 
to already existing oil-producing fields.101 In particu-
 
99  Igor Yurgens, Summitry and Diplomacy in the Arctic, Coun-
cil of Councils Sixth Regional Conference, Centre for Inter-
national Governance Innovation, 28–30 September 2014 
(Canada: CoC, 2014). 
100  EU, “Council Decision 2014/872/CFSP of 4 December 
2014”, Official Journal of the European Union L 349 (2014): 58–60. 
101  Atle Staalesen, “The New Round of EU and US Sanctions 
Aims at Russian Offshore Arctic Oil and Gas Projects, and Could 
lar, they target future oil projects that would approxi-
mately come on stream in 5–10 years. On 21 December 
2015, the EU prolonged economic sanctions against 
Russia until 31 July 2016. Norway has aligned itself 
with the EU’s sanctions regime.102 Norway joined the 
EU’s sanctions right after a deal between Rosneft and 
Norwegian North Atlantic Drilling Ltd. was accom-
plished to buy six oilfields and take a 30 per cent share 
in that company till 2022.103 
The imposition of Western sanctions as a response 
to destabilisation has its political rationale, but this 
should not lead to the false belief that there will be 
no serious consequences for the energy sphere. They 
do not come at a negligible cost, despite the currently 
relaxed and well-supplied international oil and gas 
markets. The decision to sanction oil development in 
Arctic deep-sea waters is notable in many respects: Arc-
tic oil exploration and production are highly sensitive 
issues for Western societies because of climate and 
ecological concerns. Moreover, the economic viability 
of these projects is questionable anyway in the current 
low-price environment. Western sanctions have tar-
geted Russian Arctic oil activities and, in doing so, 
they have targeted activities that the West has lost (at 
least for the moment) interest in because of shale oil 
and gas production in North America, in addition to 
climate concerns. With this approach, the West is 
hitting the sore spot in the Russian economy, forcing 
the Russian energy companies to change strategic 
priorities, or at least to postpone them. 
It remains to be seen in the future how this will 
affect natural gas exploration and production, but 
also Russian and Western energy cooperation in gen-
eral. On the one hand, the return on investment capi-
tal is questionable, given the costs of the recently 
drilled Universitetskaya-1 well in the Kara Sea, in co-
operation with ExxonMobil (the costs have reached 
US$600 billion104), even though the price forecasts for 
the potential resources are huge. On the other hand, 
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international investors have gone through a variety of 
challenges in the Russian oil and natural gas industry: 
changing tax regimes and contractual conditions (pro-
duction-sharing agreements on Sakhalin were consid-
ered to be unfair), expropriation, bureaucracy, ecologi-
cal claims, etc. Thus, the potential of Russian oil and 
natural gas resources might still prove to be attractive 
to international energy and service companies.105 Yet, 
without doubt, the situation of sanctions and counter-
sanctions creates political uncertainty and oil price 
volatility, which threatens massive long-term invest-
ments. It also complicates technical cooperation and 
transfer of know-how. 
Thus, what the sanctions have possibly achieved 
by now is that they have impeded the opportunity to 
innovate and modernise the technology of the Russian 
oil and natural gas industry. In the case of the develop-
ment of offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic, 
the first and last point of cooperation is technology: 
Vast and valuable potential resources cannot be ex-
tracted from the bottom of the Arctic seas without 
having available the “best practice”. This has also been 
emphasised by Germany and the EU. Being in an Arc-
tic lock-in, Russian companies are now looking to Chi-
nese, Malaysian and Indonesian second-best technol-
ogies. This has dramatically increased environmental 
and safety risks, even though EU and US sanctions 
keep a gap open for spill-response and rescue equip-
ment. Thus, the consequences of non-cooperation 
might be serious setbacks, or even threats to ecologi-
cal safety, as well as technological progress. 
There are likely to be profound long-term costs for 
the Russian petroleum industry. Again, until the crisis 
over Ukraine, it looked as if the path towards a coopera-
tive and innovative development of Arctic offshore 
projects had been found. Russia has a major interest 
in exploring its Arctic resources, both as a means to 
maintain production levels (as old giant fields onshore 
are depleting) and to modernise the industry. In recent 
years Arctic offshore exploration and development 
have received a qualitative and quantitative kick from 
growing international involvement and cooperation. 
Russian companies have invited international part-
ners to explore the potential of offshore oil and 
natural gas resources of the Russian Arctic, and, in 
turn, international partners have brought capital 
 
105  Mikael Holter, “Norway Oil Services See Russia Sanctions 
Risking Arctic Push”, Bloomberg Business, 12 August 2014, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-12/norway-
oil-services-risking-arctic-chances-on-russian-sanctions. 
investments and technologies. The sanctions mean, 
in the near future, that the first and only offshore oil 
project in the Russian Arctic is Prirazlomnoye. All 
drilling activities that were planned in order to meet 
Russia’s Arctic ambitions were undertaken by inter-
national companies, which have pulled back.106 There 
are few visible effects today and their impact is un-
clear, but the real consequences will become evident 
in (more than) 5 to 10 years’ time. 
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Outlook and Conclusions 
 
Growing Antagonism between the West and 
Russia – From Soft to Hard Security Interests? 
The prevalence of geopolitics is spilling over into the 
Arctic. This affects both hydrocarbon development 
and also Arctic governance issues. In the past, oil and 
gas activities paved the road for cooperation, but this 
momentum has lost its vigour due to energy markets 
as well as price developments. The dramatic change 
brought by sanctions is that the period of previously 
silent and smooth cooperation in the Arctic has most 
likely come to an end. 
With Western–Russian energy cooperation on the 
wane, “hard security matters are moving to the fore-
front”.107 The current geopolitical tensions and the 
deterioration of political relations between Russia and 
the West are negatively affecting Arctic cooperation, 
for example through a higher level of militarisation 
of the Arctic region. Russia has a traditional security 
interest in the Arctic, which was kept to a low and 
pragmatic level in the period between the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and (almost) the first decade of 
the 2000s. As Pavel Baev notes, “[…] the Kremlin’s 
Arctic policy had followed a two-pronged strategy: 
strong emphasis on developing international coopera-
tion on the one hand, and the sustained build-up of 
military capabilities on the other”.108 Yet, nowadays, 
the “securitisation” of the Arctic is a strategic priority 
for the Russian government and one of the transfor-
mational processes in the region that is speeding up. 
In Russian Arctic politics, economic rationales are less 
pronounced, whereas “hard security matters” and geo-
political competition are being highlighted with the 
appointment of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin 
to the newly created position of chairman of the State 
Commission for Arctic Development.109 Since then, 
Russia has resumed its military presence. Since the 
beginning of 2014, Russia has established its fifth joint 
operational command in the Arctic. It has extensively 
deployed nuclear assets, including strategic aviation 
 
107  Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Arctic Ambitions”, in Arctic 
Security Matters, ed. Jokela (see note 15), 51–56 (53). 
108  Ibid., 51. 
109  Ibid.; Koivurova, Käpylä and Mikkola, Continental Shelf 
Claims in the Arctic (see note 79), 7. 
patrols, and carried out tests at the naval strategic 
platforms of the Northern Fleet.110 With dialogue and 
cooperation at a minimum, a “security dilemma”111 
is looming because the level of knowledge and under-
standing about the motivations and interests of other 
actors is decreasing. Securitisation is happening in 
other Arctic countries as well – the United States and 
Canada conduct regular military exercises in the High 
North; Finland, Norway and Sweden conduct joint air exer-
cises, etc. Securitisation brings no positive results in 
making the Arctic a zone of peace and cooperation 
for all the countries involved there, and it is partly the 
consequence of tensions between Russia and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and recent politi-
cal tensions due to the Ukrainian conflict. There is the 
danger of returning to old times: Geopolitically, the 
Arctic was a highly strategic – and militarised – region 
during the East-West conflict. 
As outlined above in the chapter on diverging 
national interests, the growing level of antagonism 
and geopolitical tensions are shaking up the coopera-
tive spirit and raising levels of mistrust. All five circum-
polar states are involved in (at least one) territorial dis-
pute. Russia, Canada and Denmark claim their sover-
eignty over the Lomonosov Ridge. A Finnish study con-
cludes that “Russia’s consistent commitment to inter-
national law can no longer be taken for granted under 
the current regime”.112 In May 2015, Norway was con-
fronted with a stern diplomatic note saying that Oslo 
violated a treaty when its 23rd licensing round in-
cluded two blocks in offshore Svalbard waters.113 
Political and regulatory unpredictability adds to 
that picture, for example with respect to the Arctic 
Council114 acting as a main debate and discussion 
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forum. Tensions have negative implications on the 
Arctic Council’s activities and established discussion 
formats, which now require reformation. The geo-
political rifts over Ukraine are having an impact on 
Arctic governance, and the increasing level of distrust 
has also stalled attempts to strengthen the Arctic 
Council as the primary forum for Arctic governance. 
As described above, the EU’s influence on Arctic gov-
ernance is limited, despite the fact that its norms, 
rules and legislation extend into the Arctic, because 
Iceland and Norway are members of the Schengen 
Area and the European Economic Area. The EU has 
not yet obtained observer status in the Arctic Council. 
Due to the ongoing tensions, this item was not put on 
the agenda of the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting 
in April 2015, as originally intended. It has been 
regarded as likely that Russia will vote against this 
plan. Yet, the EU is directly involved in the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council of the Nordic States, the EU and 
Russia as well as the Northern Dimension between 
the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. In the face of the 
crisis over Ukraine, the Northern Dimension has con-
tinued to operate on a technical and working level.115 
Yet, the loss of relative stability in the Arctic may have 
multiple negative spillover effects into other areas of 
cooperation. The refugee crisis and the reluctant con-
trol of the Russian-Norwegian border by the Russian 
side is adding to a more burdened relationship between 
the Arctic neighbours. Thus, the Arctic is becoming 
less immune to critical geopolitical events outside the 
Arctic region. 
We have argued that technologically challenging 
hydrocarbon resource development has been a major 
stabilising factor in the Arctic region because of cor-
responding economic interests between Russia and 
the West. This immediate positive effect is gone. An 
immediate negative effect for global and regional 
energy supplies has not yet been noticeable. 
However, the negative consequences for energy sup-
ply (security) and the balance of demand and supply 
will only be felt in the future. Potential long-term 
effects of the sanctions, coinciding with relatively low 
oil prices and turbulences in the national economy, 
can seriously harm the long-term development of off-
shore hydrocarbon resources programmes in the Arc-
tic, thereby increasing their costs, if not killing off the 
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115  See for more details: Etzold and Steinicke, Regional 
Security and Cooperation (see note 2). 
Russian Arctic initiatives altogether. This hits Russia’s 
future role on the global oil (and possibly also gas) 
markets the longer the sanctions last. For Russia, this 
might result in the future in a loss of relative shares in 
global oil markets – thereby strengthening the position 
of other conventional producers, for example Saudi 
Arabia or, soon, Iran – but also backing shale oil pro-
duction in the United States. In the current situation 
of a fierce competition over market shares, this factor 
should not be neglected. Yet, any changes in Russian 
production will have an impact on global supplies. 
Given the severe cuts in investment into oil and gas 
projects because of low prices, the sanction on Russian 
oil development reinforce the risks of future price hikes 
and oil supply shortfalls. Much depends, of course, on 
the duration of the sanctions and how long they will 
be kept in place. Plus, it remains to be seen to what ex-
tent natural gas projects are impeded through the sanc-
tions regime, as the technology used is largely the same 
as that for oil exploration and production. Any impact 
on Russia’s future production and export capacities 
will have consequences on the supply to world mar-
kets and for the EU. Admittedly, nowadays, in times of 
an oversupply and downward cyclical swings and rela-
tively low prices, there is less of a sense of energy secu-
rity. Yet, paying attention to the objective of supply 
security should not follow cyclical price developments 
but rather anticipate future challenges. 
In face of the twin challenge of rising geopolitics 
and diminishing economic cooperation, the political 
(and economic) resources that can be generated to 
govern “soft security issues” are dwindling. The risk of 
a vicious circle is looming, as other related risks might 
no longer be able to be hedged. Such risks are indeed 
multidimensional and require international coopera-
tion, as they potentially affect more than one country 
and cannot easily be geographically limited. This is 
obvious for some specific ecological threats, which are 
especially significant for the Arctic, for example risk 
of oil spills.116 Some technological approaches bring 
more risk than safety to the Arctic, even though pro-
gress in the last years has been remarkable.117 In terms 
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of environmental safety, an affirmation of high com-
mon standards for the equipment, best practices, etc., 
plus independent supervision of drilling activities 
would be desirable. The limited technology-transfer 
brings not only environmental risks but reputational 
ones – an oil spill would be very harmful, not only 
for the sensitive nature of the polar region but for the 
involved company as well. The absence of any kind of 
joint agreement on ecological management and safety 
in the prospective resource-rich areas adds to the 
growing criticism, societal resistance, and disinvest-
ment but also to conflict potential. 
Under the current circumstances, squaring the circle 
of securing hydrocarbon supplies from the Arctic while 
at the same time creating a common vision of a more 
sustainable development of the Arctic seems out of 
reach. A number of studies focus on a “carbon bubble” 
and hint to the fact that “the unabated use of all cur-
rent fossil fuel reserves is incompatible with a warm-
ing limit of 2°C”.118 Then, the development of re-
sources in the Arctic is “incommensurate with efforts 
to limit global warming”.119 If stricter climate targets 
are really implemented, the risk of stranded invest-
ments in expensive hydrocarbon reservoirs is remark-
able,120 and especially high in the Arctic offshore. As 
the IEA outlines, the fate of complex, costly, long-term 
projects is uncertain, as climate targets may limit oil 
demand in the future. Megaprojects with huge poten-
tial, but also long timescales, will be less commercially 
attractive because of the scale and complexity of the 
work, “lending itself to delays and cost overruns”.121 
From the angle of the mitigation of climate change, 
both the implementation and non-implementation of 
hydrocarbon projects would require better coordina-
tion between business and respective states to define 
depletion paths and consumption patterns to protect 
the global commons. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations from a 
European Perspective 
Arctic offshore production is very modest and is having 
a limited influence on global consumption and pro-
duction trends. “The economic future of the Arctic 
is poised between opportunity and uncertainty.”122 
Arctic hydrocarbon exploration and production is at 
a sensitive point in time due to at least three factors: 
1) the deterioration in relations between Russia and 
the West; 2) low energy prices and 3) climate mitiga-
tion and ecological issues. The economic feasibility of 
these resources is very speculative. International cli-
mate politics and also increasing societal resistance 
is resulting in political and regulatory uncertainty, 
bringing into question the profitability of oil projects. 
Energy cooperation as the major factor for stabili-
sation faces setbacks. From the end of the Cold War 
until the Ukraine crisis, energy prospects were con-
ducive to international cooperation in the region. 
This momentum has been lost and this has significant 
implications. Yet, the threat of a spillover into geo-
political tensions and military rivalries in the Arctic 
demands more – rather than fewer – international 
efforts to hedge and minimise risks. This constitutes a 
dilemma, as sanctions will stay in place most likely till 
mid-2016, depending on the developments in eastern 
Ukraine and the Minsk II process. There is also the pos-
sibility that the crisis over Ukraine transforms into a 
“frozen conflict”. If such a situation evolves, a need to 
rethink the political measures might become pressing. 
The longer the sanctions last, the less its negative effects 
on future energy security and sustainability can be 
ignored. 
There might be a delaying or even disrupting effect 
on environmental governance and the exchange of 
technology and know-how. There is a need for the 
newest technological advances, which have to be based 
on new models of cooperation and innovations for a 
sustainable Arctic. Sanctions against Russian offshore 
oil production result in second-best technology options. 
If drilling occurs in this ecologically sensitive region, 
then it should be under best practices. Over time, the 
Arctic club faces the danger of losing its drive towards 
a common level of appreciation for international law, 
rights and standards, also in order to minimise en-
vironmental risks. Sustainable regional and industrial 
development is directly dependent on international 
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cooperation and on a prudent management of inter-
dependencies. 
Based on the abovementioned assumptions and ob-
servations, the following recommendations can be put 
forward from a German and European perspective: 
1.  There is an imminent demand for new dialogue, 
trust-building and cooperation in the Arctic. There-
fore, the major recommendation to put forward is to 
keep dialogue and cooperation in place or to restart 
it. This is key to sustaining geopolitical, economic and 
environmental stability in the Arctic and beyond. The 
risks stemming from non-cooperation between Russia 
and the West are too high in the fragile Arctic environ-
ment. 
2.  The cooperation on hydrocarbon development 
should be maintained and expanded when and where 
possible and appropriate. The EU should stay aware of 
the fact that two Arctic countries, Norway and Russia, 
are key suppliers for the EU, and the EU is the major 
market for both. Norway and Russia are both highly 
dependent on future hydrocarbon development in the 
Arctic – Norway more so than Russia. Thus, a stable 
Arctic is important for EU’s supply security for oil and 
gas (as long as these hydrocarbons are part of the EU’s 
energy consumption). This is also true for the EU’s 
striving towards diversification (understood by some 
to be the diversification away from Russia), because 
Norway has its strategic base there. Norway is facing 
a production plateau in its fields that deliver to the 
EU market. In 2015 Norway delivered 108 billion 
cubic metres per year. In order to keep up the level 
of natural gas production of approximately 90–100 
billion cubic metres per year post 2023, the Barents 
Sea is key for Norway. What Norway needs to move 
forward with in terms of exploration and develop-
ment is a clear EU policy on the future role of natural 
gas and geopolitical stability in the Arctic. 
3.  Russia is key for a stable Arctic. Russia’s inter-
est in a stable region is related to the development of 
hydrocarbon resources. For Russia, Arctic projects 
have been of strategic importance and a means to 
modernise its oil and gas industry. There are good 
reasons for a trilateral rapprochement and re-engage-
ment in the high north between Norway, Russia and 
the EU/EU member states. With respect to a future 
process of rapprochement and confidence-building, 
Arctic natural gas production opens new possibilities. 
Germany/the EU, Norway and Russia should engage 
in a trialogue on a long-term “Arctic natural gas road-
map” that would also include common planning of 
(liquefied natural gas) export infrastructure. 
4.  Mutual benefits through innovation and tech-
nology-exchange should be created. This would allow 
for maintaining the highest technical and environ-
mental standards. Energy-related risks such as oil 
spills, rescue operations and nuclear disposal should 
be jointly managed. Creating and managing inter-
dependence between the Arctic countries is a real 
option for setting up a new model of cooperation and 
ecological management. Arctic research on ecology 
and climate should be continued and scientific 
cooperation should be increased. 
5.  Ideally, climate mitigation has to be made an 
integral part of hydrocarbon (non)development, for 
example by clear emission reduction plans that help 
to define a regional production/consumption and de-
pletion path for specific Arctic oil fields, also in order 
to hedge the risks of stranded assets. From an idealis-
tic perspective, it can even be argued that the Arctic 
is the showcase for how the world will live up to the 
double challenge of climate change/security and energy 
security. The Arctic has a potential to become a model 
for future intergovernmental and business coopera-
tion under unconventional and new portents. 
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